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abstract: The paper tries to explore options and preconditions for a theoretically 
thoroughly grounded conception of productivity that is able to account for its 
observer-dependency and thereby meets the needs of a dynamic and highly 
differentiated modern society. it does so in respect to insights from cybernetics 
and complexity theory, thereby taking up charges about the contradiction of 
economic productivity and the second law of Thermodynamics. in respect 
to epistemological consequences of contemporary levels of productivity, a 
seemingly paradoxical constraint is put forward: the constraint that productivity 
is conditioned on being observed as such, with the observer in its turn being 
conditioned on productivity. The assumption is that this paradoxical constitution 
helps to keep productivity adaptive to the changes it itself incites in economy.
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theory, computation, anticipatory systems
introduction
While theoretically quite simply defined, the economic concept of productivity, 
as referring to value-adding processes [1], poses problems on practical grounds. 
statisticians concerned with national accounting for instance, as well as politicians 
concerned with social and financial issues, and ordinary people worrying about 
their economic future no longer agree about what it is that counts as productive [2]. 
The modern world’s economic upswing seems to be paradoxically accompanied by a The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 3
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differentiation of perspectives. is it land, labor, material goods, technical progress, 
knowledge and whatever can be measured in money, or is it happiness, democratic 
freedom, less labor, overall wellbeing, the chance for self-determination, fresh 
air, clean water, health, longevity that drives economy? While most national and 
supranational accounting systems still focus on money, a growing number of well-
being indices is suggested and competes for an unambiguous definition of wealth. 
furthermore, with rich nations discussing “degrowth” and “a-growth” concepts (Van 
den Bergh, 2011) while developing countries try to replicate their material output, 
it appears that what counts as productive in one context may not be productive in 
others (füllsack, 2008).
The clear-cut distinction of productive and unproductive labor with which adam 
smith tried to explain the causes of wealth, and which marx momentously passed 
on to socialism as a core principle of administered labor, has dissolved in the 
plurality of perspectives that modernity provides. in short, the epistemology of 
modern society – conditioned on and embedded into its productivity, as we shall 
see – seems to oblige us to specify to whom, and in regard to what, productivity is 
considered productive. hence, i argue in this paper that speaking about productivity 
today necessitates specifying its observer.
This argument seems to call for a philosophy of science to clarify the conditions 
of observation. attempts to analytically observe these conditions however, lead 
into the dreaded circle of using these conditions while trying to clarify them, 
and produces the insight that the observer is paradoxically constituted (foerster, 
1981; luhmann, 1995, and below). What is more, conceptualizing the observer in 
terms of productivity - or at least in terms of a condition that defies entropy, as 
we shall see -, reveals that productivity is a much more complex conception than 
is usually conceded in economic textbooks. in respect to this insight, i assume 
that the aforementioned problems could be alleviated to some extent with a more 
fundamentally grounded conception of productivity.
even with such a conception however, the central problem addressed in this paper, 
that is, the problem that productivity is observer-dependent, cannot be evaded. 
in this text, i try to express this point not only in terms of content, but to some 
extent also in terms of its own demeanor. By not claiming to present a clear-
cut result or solution, this paper might deviate slightly from the usual terms of 
scientific reports; at least partially i will leave it to the reader to decide  if it can 
be considered productive. however, since writing inevitably implies to propagate a 
viewpoint, namely the one of the author, the paper in hand will nevertheless try to The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 4
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bring something forth. Drawing on insights from cybernetics, complexity theory 
and computational science it explores the options and preconditions for a more 
thoroughly grounded, but thereby necessarily also more complex (and thereby maybe 
not in every respect productive), conception of productivity.
Productivity in economic theory
To speak about the difficulty of grasping a value that is obviously (or has become?) 
[3] observer-dependent, first necessitates that one specifies one’s own perspective. 
in order to do so, i draw upon Daniel Dennett’s (1987) distinction of a “physical” 
and an “intentional” stance [4], with the former, in short, referring to a level of 
abstraction at which scientific explanations focus on physical causes (and therewith 
at least implicitly on the project of reductionism), and the later referring to a 
level of abstraction which is said to be common in every-day-explanations (“folk 
psychology”), but which  also frequently serves as the basis for what academia calls 
“the humanities”. 
Whereas the physical stance roughly conforms to what is known as objectivism, the 
intentional stance accounts for the subjective intentions and needs of humans. its 
explanations tend to assume qualities in human activities which cannot (completely 
or directly) be reduced to physical causes. for Dennett, both stances are conditioned 
on what he calls “computational power”. The assumption is that for lastingly taking 
the “physical stance” a lot more “computational power” is needed than is usually 
available in everyday-life. it needs special spheres, such as science, in which 
activities and insights are suspended from immediate application. The possibility 
of taking the “physical stance” is thus conditioned on an economic productivity 
which is able to pay for such spheres. in this respect, science is seen as a (by itself 
highly unlikely) subsystem of modern society that, on the one hand, is paid for by 
its productivity and that, on the other hand, provides a sort of aloofness with which 
productivity can be questioned to an extent which cannot but irritate classical 
economics. however, this paper builds on the assumption that this paradoxical 
setting also provides explanative possibilities, which allow for a conception of 
productivity that is more in line with the conditions of modern society.
The textbooks of classical economics usually define productivity as the ratio of 
what is produced to what is required for production (Davis, 1955; samuelson and 
nordhaus, 2004). as we understand it here, an activity is productive if its output-
input-quotient is larger than one. since input and output often are considered The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 5
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compounds, an economic process counts as productive if by doubling input factors 
output is more than doubled. in this case, economy speaks of “increasing returns 
to scale” (eatwell, 1987; Buchanan and Yong, 1994), and, in general, of “economic 
growth” (Jones, 2002; helpman, 2004; Weil, 2008). in economic theory however, the 
concrete causes of this growth often remain somewhat vaguely defined.[5] in this 
regard, value-adding productivity seems to refer simply to a process that generates 
“more than the sum of its parts”, with the mysteriousness and attractiveness of the 
“more” entailing an ongoing quest for its causes. famous historical candidates for 
these causes include: land (physiocracy), trade (mercantilism), labor (locke), its 
division (smith, ricardo), its exploitation (rodbertus, marx), its sedimentation 
in the form of capital (marx, Boehm-Bawerk, clark) inducing interests (fisher), 
technical progress (solow), innovation (coase), knowledge (romer, Jones) and 
various combination of the former (schumpeter) with further differentiations being 
suggested in the form of organizational, cultural, social and human capital for 
instance. 
as all of these factors lack measurability (a highly valued aspect in economics), 
efforts continue to concretize and quantify them, and meanwhile seem to have 
driven the search for the ultimate productive factor into the realm of information 
theory, with disciplines like bibliometrics and scientometrics occupying the 
rather applied side of the spectrum, and entropy, oriented physics as suggested 
by Georgescu-roegen (1971), marking its fundamental side. in respect to this 
fundamental side, it seems legitimate to classify respective endeavors as turning 
away from the “intentional stance” and taking what could be called a “physical 
stance”. mainstream economics so far does not associate with this line of research. 
it seems appropriate, therefore, to see what this research could add to the 
understanding and conceptualization of productivity and what problems it might 
entail. 
Productivity and the second law of Thermodynamics
at the level of abstraction of the “physical stance”, (value adding) productivity, 
or economic growth, appears to contradict the physical principle known as the 
second law of Thermodynamics. in broad terms, this law states that statistically 
seen entropy inevitably increases and order decays in the universe. if we follow the 
assumption that a productive process generates something that is “more than the 
sum of its parts” and hence implies an increase in order, respectively a decrease in The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 6
füllsack, manfred (2012) ‘observing productivity: what it might mean to be  
productive when viewed through the lens of complexity Theory’,  
The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
entropy[6], we pose a challenge to scientific explanation. What on the level of the 
“intentional stance” might be explained as an effect of a specific arrangement of 
inputs, becomes a fundamental problem in the realm of physics.
however, at this level of abstraction, there are many theoretical and methodological 
conceptions which seem apt to answer this challenge. The conception of “dissipative 
structures” for instance (Prigogine and nicolis, 1977; Prigogine and stengers, 
1984), expanded by assumptions about a relation, if not equivalence, of energy and 
information (of bits to ergs) (Bennett, 1982), seems to allow us to reformulate it 
in terms of improbability and informational uncertainty, and to investigate the 
apparently counterintuitive increase of order by way of computation. meanwhile, 
this has entailed a wide spectrum of investigations in emergent structures based on 
suggestions that we conceptualize the world in terms of a huge cellular automaton 
(Dennett, 1991, 2003; Wolfram, 2002; fredkin, 2003) and subsequently redefine (and 
redesign) scientific research in terms of information theory and respective methods. 
currently, these investigations range from fundamental research, such as the one 
on “universal computation,” (Wolfram, 2002) or the one on “order at the edge of 
chaos,” (langton, 1991; Kauffman, 1993) which tries to grasp what could be called 
the minimal preconditions of “productivity,” to complex and far-reaching endeavors 
into a-life research (fellermann et al., 2010). This research also entails fiercely 
fought disputes about reductionism and the possibility of a “Theory of everything” 
(Weinberg, 1987; Dennett, 2003: 68).
entropy-decrease through increase
Within the realm of this research, findings like those of Parunak and Brueckner 
(2001) might be interpreted as a kind of answer to the contradiction of increasing 
returns and the second law of Thermodynamics. as Parunak and Brueckner 
showed in the example of simulated ants coordinating their foraging activities 
with the help of artificial pheromones, the decrease of entropy (hence increase of 
order, or growth) has to be seen as coupled to a micro-level-order decrease. The 
macro-level-order of coordinated ants seems to arise from an increase in disorder 
on the micro-level of pheromone-diffusion. in other words, ants seem to “pay” 
for the productivity gain of coordinated foraging with the loss of order through 
entropic diffusion of pheromones. The productivity on n-level-order appears to be 
compensated by “unproductivity” on a n-1-level-order. as Parunak and Brueckner 
could show by way of statistics, the increase does not just outweigh the macro-level-The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 7
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decrease but seems to increase entropy in the overall system, so that the second law 
is fully satisfied.
as seen from the “physical stance”, this might be a universal principle, as other 
examples of entropy decreases through coupled increase can be easily found. 
Parunak and Brueckner themselves, for example, mention the dissemination 
of a common currency,“money,” in order to facilitate the exchange of otherwise 
incompatible goods and services. Georgescu-roegen (1971) emphasized pollution as 
the downward aspect of productivity. analogously, the institution of highly dynamic 
scientific communications (publications, congresses, etc.), which enable cognition, 
or, maybe more to the point, the provision of fecund economic environments for 
the start of businesses, seems to draw on respective possibilities. The most general 
example in this regard might be evolution itself, with a few “fittest” individuals 
eventually representing order and growth, and a huge fraction of “unfit” being 
sacrificed in order to enable the survival of the few.
This brings up a new problem for our considerations: productivity, as seen with the 
“physical stance”, does not seem “really” productive. only if we pre-decide to focus 
our interest on the entropy-decreasing aspect of this process, that is, on the side of 
the gain of order, can we consider it productive. according to the “physical stance” 
however, we should either not pre-decide, or we should account for each pre-decision 
in terms of a consistent conception. since we are interested in productivity, and are 
hence pre-decided, we draw the observer into the game. What is more, we regard the 
observer on a level of abstraction at which it [7] can also be conceptualized in terms 
of entropy-decrease.
as a preliminary, it should be noted that this endeavor obviously leads into 
a circular, that is, a self-referential conception, a conception that, from a 
conventional point of view, seems to run aground by clarifying its preconditions 
while using them. however, as insights from mathematical and computational 
theory suggest, such an endeavor does not necessarily run dry in the infinite 
regress that classical philosophy dreaded so much. as in the case of what is 
called Gödel’s encoding (“Gödelisierung”) in mathematics or Turing machines in 
computational theory (that is, machines, which allow for a concurrency of program 
and programmed, for a computation of data that is enacted by other data provided 
in the same medium), this endeavor seems to be formalizable and simulatable. it 
therewith might allow for saying something useful, maybe even “productive” about 
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füllsack, manfred (2012) ‘observing productivity: what it might mean to be  
productive when viewed through the lens of complexity Theory’,  
The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
The observer - and its observer
The first feature that springs to mind when regarding the above examples of 
entropy-decrease through increase is the fact that the observer is a “result-seer”. 
What it gets to see are results, rather than the processes that lead to these results. 
When observing ants for example, the observer tends to see readily coordinated 
insects rather than the process of coordination, which in this case is the diffusion 
of pheromones. The same applies to evolution. What is usually [8] seen is the result 
of natural selection, but not evolution itself. hence, what the observer perceives 
as productive conforms to the ontology of productivity and not to its ontogenesis, 
or as Prigogine (1980) writes, to its Being and not its Becoming. alluding to 
William James’ sculptor[9], we might say that what is perceived as productive - a 
(temporarily) stable decrease of entropy - appears to be a “cutout” from the overall 
picture, and moreover, a cutout generated by the one who perceives it as order, that 
is, by the observer.
calling the observed a “cutout” however, entails an irritating philosophical 
consequence which may be considered abrogated by the fundamentality of 
constructivism: namely the necessity of assuming something (a Kantian “Ding 
an sich”) behind the observed. “cutting out” or “selecting” implies a plurality of 
instances from which something can be selected. on the abstraction level of the 
“physical stance” however, the observer is an abstract being which has no conception 
whatsoever of an overall world from which it  selects or cuts something out. This 
observer is thought to observe what it observes, and nothing more. so when speaking 
of a “cutout”, one obviously implies an observer of the observer, a second (order) 
observer[10], who can see that the first (order) observer cuts something out.
although the process of observing the observer might eventually induce “self-
observation” - as will be discussed below -, for the time being, in order to keep to the 
“physical stance”, we should regard this second (order) observer as having no other 
abilities or qualities than the first (order) observer. This means that this second 
observer in  turn necessitates an observer in order to be conceivable; this applies to 
any further observer as well. in-depth considering the resulting chain (or network) 
of observations, it turns out that observation needs observation in order to be and 
therewith implies the above mentioned infinite regress. in the realm of complexity 
theory and related disciplines however, such reciprocal dependency is not considered 
a tragedy. The mutual provision of possibility, or, as it might be termed in regard to 
the conception of Bayesian networks, the mutual provision of probability, is known The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 9
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to run up to attractors which might seem “strange” at times, but which are stable 
enough for to provide the footing of further dynamics (abraham and shaw, 1984; 
strogatz, 2001; füllsack, 2012b). i come back to this later on.
regularities
for the moment let’s return to the “results” of order generating processes. The reason 
for the observer observing results, and (usually) not processes, can be seen in the fact 
that only results possess the regularity on which the observer can capitalize. What 
do we mean by this?
in order to explain the phrase “capitalizing on regularities”, i suggest following 
the considerations of francesco Varela (1992:7) and regarding the most general 
“reason” to observe something as an act of emerging and maintaining existence, 
meaning that an observer observes something which it can use as a “resource” for its 
existence. note that this implies regarding the observer as taking an “intentional 
stance” towards the “resource”. With the “physical stance” however, it should be 
possible to regard a “resource” not immediately as nourishment or fuel or any other 
means an observer might aim its actions at, but to take it most abstractly as a kind 
of advantage or leverage which the observer can deploy to emerge as such, and to 
persist - and be it only for a brief moment in time.
maybe the most basic form of such a “resource” can be seen in regularities. The 
reason for this is best explained with a short excursion into the attempts to find 
measures for complexity. among many such measures (see lloyd 2001 for a list, 
mitchell 2009 for an introduction) are predictability (shannon-entropy) and 
compressibility (algorithmic complexity). a highly regular process, for example 
the one which would generate the sequence {101010101010101010101010 ...}, allows 
for a pretty safe prediction about the next coming event, the binary 1 in this case. 
The tossing of a fair coin on the other hand seems to impede any such prediction 
(if not just statistical). Thus, a process which is predictable in its outcome can be 
compressed. The above sequence could be represented by the rule <print 12 times “10”> 
for instance. compression thus economizes on computational power. it provides a 
predictive leverage. one might say, it provides a possibility to do the same with less 
input. it allows being productive.
if an entity that uses this possibility can emerge, it might gain an advantage against 
the entropy of its environment. it can capitalize on this possibility. Therefore, on The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 10
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the condition of the emergence of such an entity, regularity can be considered a 
“resource” on which to capitalize. if one assumes this possibility to be one of many, 
that is, if one is ready to concede that such an entity in its existence might itself 
provide a regularity on which a next-order-entity again finds a chance to capitalize 
on (füllsack 2012a), one could say that such regularities conform to an abstract 
form of what, in the marxian sense of “frozen labor,” has been termed capital.[11]
on first view, “high” regularity might seem easier to capitalize on than “lower” 
regularity; for example, the sequence {10101010111010101010...} seems to hold a 
little “error” after the first four 10s. This in mind, the reason for the observer being 
a “result-seer” might be seen in the fact that an evolutionary process, or a system of 
foraging ants coupled with pheromone diffusion, appears to be most regular when 
it is “finished,” that is, when initial fluctuations have cooled down and the process 
seems to have found a state from which it no longer deviates significantly. one 
might assume that this steady state provides more, or at least sufficient, regularity 
for an observer to capitalize on, that is, to gain a productive advantage with which 
to maintain its existence. however, in the fundamental simplicity of the “physical 
stance”, the observer must not be thought to exist earlier than a regularity on which 
it might capitalize. The observer does not exist prior to observing regularity. it 
does not wait somewhere out there pre-given for an evolutionary process to “finish”. 
This, in its turn, implies that the “finished” (or steady) state which an evolutionary 
process might run up to depends on the observer’s ability to capitalize on its 
regularities. in other words, the “end” of such a process is not absolute but rather 
a relative state dependent upon the observer. The end is where the observer starts 
from - to paraphrase mihai nadin (2003). in other words, the end is brought forth 
by the observer, which in turn is brought forth by the end. This end is “enacted”, 
in the sense of Varela, Thompson and rosch (1991). This means that it depends 
on the observer’s complexity, on the degree of regularity that the observer itself 
possesses, while the complexity of the observer depends on the complexity of its 
world. in its most abstract form therefore, the observer is a regularity that emerges 
by capitalizing on other regularities, with these regularities resulting from an 
evolutionary process that is “enacted” (i.e. interactively generated) by the observer. 
The result and the regularity, that is, the observed and the observer, mutually 
determine each other. They reciprocally provide footing to each other.
The principle at issue repeats on this level: there needs to be regularity for an 
observer to emerge, and there needs to be an observer to observe regularity. in short, 
there must be order to induce order. What to classical analytic attempts might seem The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 11
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paradoxical and impossible - to conceive such a “bottomless” mutual provision of 
possibilities - is currently finding practical investigation in a rapidly broadening 
spectrum of computer-based methods relying in particular on multi-agent-
simulations and Genetic algorithms (holland, 1995; Jaeger, 2000; füllsack, 2011).
Distinct and indicate
as we have seen, regularity implies compressibility, and compressibility saves 
computational power. one thus might see the core condition of productivity in 
regularities - with the paradoxical constraint that productivity therewith is 
conditioned on an observer, which is conditioned on it. hence, the condition for 
an observer to “be”, and therewith the condition for productivity, is a world with 
regularities and a mechanism with which to “compress” regularities. a theoretical 
conception of these two conditions can be seen in George spencer-Brown’s (1969) 
suggestion that we  define observation as the dual operation of “distinction and 
indication”. as mentioned above, this definition, when deconstructed, necessitates 
not just one observation but two. on a first-order level, the distinction (the first 
aspect of the dual) might be brought forth by a multitude of random differentiations 
(distinctions) of which one is eventually observed (by a second-order observer) as 
“successful” or “final”, and thereby indicating a certain state, for example the “result” 
of an evolution. This state thus becomes the “observed” state, but only by being a 
“result” in itself  a “result” which is brought forth by another observer.
The observer thus, if observed, appears to observe by differentiating its world into 
bisections and indicating one of them as the one relevant for further operations, 
that is for further observations. an air conditioning system, for example, observes 
its world by differentiating warm and cold temperatures and indicating one of them 
as reason for sending an on-signal to a heater. a computer differentiates binaries 
and indicates one of them as the state from which to start the next computation. an 
organism distinguishes usable resources from unusable and indicates usable ones as 
those that are relevant to maintaining existence[12]. on the abstraction level of the 
“physical stance,” this process might be thought of as simply “observing by being”, 
that is embodying a “distinction and indication” via existence. a plant, for instance, 
distinguishes sunlight from eternal darkness by indicating sunlight with its 
existence. The famous Game-of-life-Glider (see füllsack 2011 for an explanation) 
distinguishes and indicates - hence “observes” - the 25 Gol-cells and their 
particular rule-based interrelations, which provide those regularities that enable its The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 12
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persistence in time and space. if one dares to strain wording even more, one might 
say that these specific 25 Gol-cells and their interrelations are the “resource” on 
which the Glider emerges and exists. 
more generally one might formally define “observation” as a distinction that turns 
out to be capitalizable and is therefore indicated by the emergence of an entity 
that uses the neg-entropic advantage it gains from this observation to maintain its 
existence for the next given moment in time.
Productive upgrades
This emergence, however, might be momentous for the observer itself, since it alters 
the “initial” regularity through which it emerged. The “initial” regularity becomes, 
so to speak, suspended (“aufgehoben”) in the triple meaning of hegelian German. it 
lives on as manifested in the internal complexity of its observer. at the same time, 
it is abolished, since it is altered by the existence of the observer; the world changed 
with its existence. furthermore, it is lifted to a new level, at which it again might 
provide sufficient regularity for a new, and arguably a bit more complex, observer, 
which, if successful, repeats this suspension on the next level of order.
in its own complexity, this n+1-level-observer therewith might be thought of as 
building on the complexity of the n-level observer. for the n+1-level-observer the 
n-level-observer serves as a “resource” which hands on a part of the neg-entropic 
advantage that itself could gain. This passing-on of neg-entropy seems to allow for 
increasingly effective attempts to capitalize on “self-made” regularities. observed 
productivity thus might drive itself into an ongoing process of productive upgrades 
(füllsack, 2012a).
These upgrades can further be explained by what William ross ashby (1956) has 
called the “law of requisite variety”, which, in short, states that variety is needed 
to cope with variety. if a regularity is uncomplicated (for example the sequence 
{1010101010...}), a simple observation might suffice to unfailingly predict the 
next coming event and thus to safely compress the sequence; however, a regularity 
which is just statistically regular, that is, one that contains “errors”, might still 
be compressible and provide predictive leverage. But this leverage depends on how 
much “noise” its observer can take. This, in turn, depends on the existence and 
complexity of a sort of controlling mechanism which observes the regularity of the 
regularity, that is, the “noise”, or the amount of “errors” in the regularity.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 13
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one might conceive this controlling mechanism as a sort of internal second-order-
observer, an observer with the task of observing the observations of the (internal) 
first-order observer in respect to “dangerous” deviations from regularities, - an 
observer, so to speak, that observes the regularity of irregularities. since these 
irregularities might also be statistically regular, one could conceive of yet another 
(internalized) observer who observes the observations of the controlling mechanism, 
and so on, constituting a “requisite variety” of distinctions and indications that 
build on each other. Depending on the environment in which these observations 
take place, this “requisite variety” of mutually observing “control-levels” might 
refine and thereby significantly enhance the system’s possibility to capitalize on 
regularities.
since the operations of such a system generate noise of their own, it might seem 
conceivable that eventually such a system would appear  to spend more attention 
on observing its internal operations, than on observing its world. such a system 
seems to shift its observational operations from its environment to itself. it seems to 
observe itself, that is, to capitalize on self-generated regularities. in the terminology 
of spencer-Brown (1969), such a system performs a re-entry of its own operations. 
maturana and Varela (1987) suggested that we refer to such systems as “autopoietic.”
intentionality
at this point, Dennett’s “intentional stance” comes back into the picture. remember 
that we spoke about intentionality in regard to the Gol-Glider, although in an 
overly metaphoric way. a composite system however, with several control-levels 
observing each other’s operations and thus internalizing the distinction and 
indication of productivity, might be regarded as operating with an amount of 
intentionality that exceeds metaphoricity. in 2006 Josh Bongard and his colleagues 
(2006) presented the now famous “continuous self-modeling machine”, a starfish-
shaped robot, which uses a model of itself and its environment to “virtually” pre-test 
combinations of movements that its limbs are able to perform. The machine than 
“cuts out” those movements from the multitude of test-movements that appear to 
be productive in terms of motion. if one of the limbs of the machine is removed, it 
repeats the search for a productive combination of actions until it finds a new way 
to walk.
as seen with a “physical stance”, this machine works (and also emerges)[13] on the 
aforementioned principle of “entropy decrease via increase”. The machine performs, The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 14
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so to speak, an opulent waste of virtual motions in order to carve out from its space 
of options those that might eventually prove productive. however, this machine 
would hardly be of interest, if it is considered only in regard to its physics. What 
makes it a “productive” result of scientific endeavors is the apparent autonomy with 
which it seems to intentionally look for ways to maintain motion. The machine is 
observed (and presented) with an “intentional stance”. 
its autonomy thereby stems from the fact that we, the (second-order-) observers, 
observe the principle of “entropy decrease via increase” as an integral process of 
the robot itself. We observe the machine as a whole with an autonomous intention 
to walk. and we do this even in spite of our physical-stance-knowledge (i.e. our 
scientific knowledge) that the robot is just a machine.
at this point, the reason for deploying the distinction of “physical” and “intentional 
stance” in this context should become clear. as said before, the distinction denotes 
levels of abstraction and has an economical implication in Dennett’s conception. 
By itself, it is not free to decide, but is determined by the costs of computational 
power. as a consequence, usually we cannot simply choose to take one or the other 
stance, nor can we deliberately oscillate between their perspectives. as with every 
observer, our stance is determined by the capacity to capitalize on the regularities 
at hand, that is, by our potential to cope with complexity. Because this complexity 
can be quite overwhelming at times, it does not make sense to account for it in each 
and every context. in every-day-life, for instance, it would be senseless to consider 
the myriads of neurons and their connections that our brains lavishly deploy 
to guarantee an optimal balance between stable and flexible behavior (between 
exploitation and exploration, as evolutionary theory calls it). in this context, we 
would be helplessly overburdened if we acted and observed with a “physical stance”. 
on this abstraction level, the “intentional stance” makes sense because, in the words 
of Dennett, it saves computational power. it provides the needed predictive leverage, 
while minimizing computational efforts.[14] in every-day-life it suffices to simply 
account for the effect, for the “result” of the lavish deployment of neurons in our 
brains. and it suffices to call its adaptation learning rather than evolution. at this 
level, we are not driven by the “blind teleology” (Dawkins) of evolutionary selection. 
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Bottomlessness
as we know from everyday life, intentional planning can be quite efficient. in some 
sense, it can increase productivity dramatically. The current state of the world, with 
its order and dynamic growth, would hardly be conceivable without the effectiveness 
of plans and intentions. in this state far from thermodynamic equilibrium, 
productivity seems enhanced to such an extent that our capacities to cope with 
complexity allow us to capitalize on regularities at an unprecedented level. The 
enormous productivity gain evoked by intentionality, however, entails a paradox 
consequence. it pays for, and eventually institutionalizes, a level of abstraction 
at which what it means to be productive is systematically questioned. This is the 
highly unlikely abstraction level of the “physical stance” and its institutionalized 
manifestation called science. in its sphere of influence productivity is not only 
considered an intended and desired goal of human activities; its preconditions and 
possibility are also investigated “objectively.”  
one might, at first, attribute this seemingly strange twofold dynamic to a simple 
temporal shift that the “intentional stance” entails, a shift from backward-oriented 
to forward-oriented processes. in this regard, the “intentional stance” acts like 
an observer itself. it shifts the temporal bias from the past to the future. While 
triggering a dramatic increase in productivity on one hand, it also “virtualizes” 
productivity. 
as we have seen, the “blind teleology” of evolutionary processes builds on a plurality 
of instances that seem to exist at first in order only to then distill a productive 
result from them. on the contrary, the “explicit teleology” of intentional activities 
can advance a “result” which only then tries to find amortization by spreading costs 
over a plurality of instances. a hammer exemplifies both cases. a hammer might be 
bought because of (past) experiences in which one has need to drive in nails. But, 
it also might be bought on the (future) expectation that once one has driven in a 
certain number of nails, the hammer will be worth its costs.[15] The latter seems 
more momentous, since it includes the possibility of repeating this advancement 
even before the costs of the first investment have been paid off. one might not have 
done enough hammering to make the purchase of the hammer reasonable, before 
one starts to think about also buying pliers on the assumption that once one has 
removed so many nails, the pliers will also be worth their purchase cost.
in short, intentionality, and the expectations and anticipations it enables, can 
trigger chains of next-order-investments on the expectation that the investments The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 16
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will eventually pay for themselves. as a result, the probability of, as well as the need 
for, anticipating activities seems to increase. With the possibility for activities that 
postpone their amortization further and further into the future, anticipations begin 
to drive anticipations, with the actual pay-off sliding more and more out of view. 
amortization itself becomes irrelevant, and one might ask if this is the true reason 
for the unprecedented upswing of productivity in modern times.
asking this question in this way, of course again implies that a transcendental truth 
lies behind what can be observed, that is, an unobserved truth of vague and unclear 
definition. if one decides to consider productive whatever an observer can capitalize 
on, - and therewith can emerge and maintain its existence -, one should accept the 
possibility of an economy in which advances are continuously and increasingly 
refinanced with other advances, and the actual pay-off is eternally delayed.[16] of 
course one could stress that observers of this sort live in continuous debt; in regard 
to environmental issues, this is indeed a fact to consider. on theoretical grounds 
however, insights, such as those into the physics of complex networks for instance 
(and its currently most well-known example: the Page-rank-algorithm, cf. Brin and 
Page (1998) and füllsack (2011) for a respective interpretation), show that such 
“bottomless” systems of reference are not metaphysical chimeras, but rather are able 
to provide footing for momentous next-order-dynamics to emerge. such systems tend 
to run up to at times “strange,” but stabile attractors, to “eigen-values” (foerster, 
1981) with far-reaching, and at times self-undermining, effects. however, in their 
plasticity and reactivity such systems can show quite high adaptivity to changes 
which they themselves bring about. since productivity, as i have conceived it in this 
paper, is a paradox and self-undermining conception, it might need this seemingly 
strange constitution in order to continually adapt to the developments that it incites.
epilogue
in his seminal book on the origin of Wealth, eric Beinhocker (2006: 9) locates 
modernity’s productivity take-off[17] at about the year 1750 and suggests that the 
reason for it lies in what he calls “rational deduction” (cf. 2006: 258f). contrasted 
to what Beinhocker calls the blind “experimental tinkering” of evolution, 
“rational deduction” relates to what i have called the “intentional stance”. it 
builds on a systematic use of analysis, of concepts and plans, and needs organisms 
or mechanisms which are complex enough to use self-models in order to deploy 
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in human contexts, of course, the institutionalized form of “rational deduction” 
is science, which took off at approximately that time. following Dennett again, 
we might say that science needs a good deal of computational power in order to 
maintain its high level of abstract problem solving activities (or in other words, in 
order to take in the “physical stance”). We might also say that it gains this power 
through the suspension of some every-day-life-necessities, particularly the need 
for an immediate applicability of its problem solutions. This suspension, in turn, 
is “paid for” by modern society’s productivity, which is enacted and enforced by 
“rational deduction”. hence, one might say that the highly abstract level of the 
“physical stance,” as taken in by many modern sciences, emerges and “lives” on 
the productivity of the “intentional stance”, which, in turn, supports and enforces 
science and therewith the “physical stance”.
The “physical stance”, however, as this paper has tried to demonstrate, is not 
unambiguous in its enhancement of productivity. it also tends to undermine its 
own enabling conditions. modern science’s particular eigen-logics of measuring its 
output in terms of its own internal criteria (e.g. citation impact instead of market 
value), allow for a level of abstraction at which productivity itself can be questioned 
for its productivity. in other words, science indeed seems to incite a reductionism 
which can do no other than leave the question of whether itself is productive open to 
an observer which might emerge by finding capitalizable regularities in it, thereby 
once again re-defining what it means to be productive.
endnotes
[1] The meaning of the term productivity in this paper deviates slightly from 
textbook definitions referring to a formal output-to-input ratio which can be 
positive as well as negative. What is at stake here is the somehow less neutral notion 
of “productive” as opposed to “unproductive” processes.
[2] see for example the report of the commission on the measurement of economic 
Performance and social Progress, headed by Joseph stiglitz, amartya sen and 
Jean-Paul fitoussi, retrievable at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm 
(22.9.2011). see also easterlin 1974, cobb et al. 1995, World Bank 1997, Kahneman 
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[3] This refers to historical changes in social structure as have been highlighted by 
niklas luhmann (1995). Due to space restriction i will not discuss this aspect at 
length in this paper.
[4] i will neglect Dennett’s “design stance” here.
[5] With the probably most cited example being the “residual” in solow’s (1956) 
conception of Total factor Productivity. 
[6] Which slightly deviates from regarding productivity as a general category or a 
measure, of which only one aspect refers to a positive ratio of output to input (cf. 
fn. 1).
[7] The observer, as it is conceptualized here subsequently to spencer-Brown, 
foerster, luhmann etc. (see below), is a formal entity. To ascribe gender to it would 
be misleading.
[8] “usually” refers to the every-day-commonness of the “intentional stance” as 
distinguished from the highly abstract, and therefore unlikely, “physical stance”.
[9] in James’ (1890/1983, i: 288) picture, this sculptor initially faces thousand 
different statues in the block of stone from which he eventually extricates the 
one that finally will be observable as his oeuvre. he does so “by simply removing 
portions of the given stuff”, that is, by increasing entropy in his studio. 
[10] This, of course, refers to “observing systems” in the sense of heinz von foerster 
(1981), that is, in the double-sense of the english -ing form, as systems observing 
observing systems.
[11] however, as one might want to add here in regard to the topic of this paper, 
“frozen labor” differs from what murray Gell-mann (1995) has called a “frozen 
accident” by nothing else than observation.
[12] on a hardly less abstract level than spencer-Brown, niklas luhmann (1995) 
uses this formula to explain the emergence of a system by being distinguished 
by an observer from its environment and indicated as the relevant observable 
entity. The clue in this conception, however, is the fact that complex systems are 
considered self-observing and therewith might maintain the distinction from their 
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[13] This becomes visible if one considers the abundant mass of trials and errors 
producing less effective robots and other predecessor machines from which finally 
the self-modeling starfish-robot was “cut out”.
[14] in this regard, i dare to predict that in the extent that our interactions with 
artifacts like the starfish-robot increase in daily life, we will start to ascribe 
intentionality to them – simply for economic reasons. already today, “discussions” 
with language operated GPs devices for instance, when believing to know the way 
better, seem to provide illustrative examples.
[15] To this example: leroi-Gourhan (1993), and its influence on Derrida’s “future 
anterior”.
[16] a respective view on economy has been suggested by Böhm-Bawerk as 
early as the 19th century. With his “time-consuming production roundabouts” 
(“zeitaufwändige Produktionsumwege”), or shortly “roundaboutness”, as the actual 
cause of productivity gains, he clear-sightedly indicated interests as triggering 
other interests, and not labor exploitation, as the decisive mean of capitalism. more 
recently, and also more explicit as to the effects of this logic, niklas luhmann 
(1995) suggested to consider the closure of dynamics mutually providing footing to 
each other, as the central characteristic of contemporary social conditions.
[17] Which Beinhocker (2006: 9) suggests to account for in terms of the store 
keeping units of modernity’s consumer world.
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